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Fire presents a clear and present danger to computer equipment and generally 
results in tremendous expense or irreplaceable loss.  This study serves as a 
proof of concept for using computer-based fire modeling to investigate the 
resilience of typical data center equipment to fire.  In this analysis, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s Fire Dynamics Simulator computer-
based fire modeling tool is utilized to simulate fire scenarios within a rack-mount-
style computer enclosure containing six circuit boards.  Outcomes including 
effects of combustion (heat, mixture fraction, and species generation) and water-
based sprinkler suppression are explored.  Although the presence of standard 
water-based sprinkler suppression proves advantageous, it is not consistently 
effective in terminating this class of combustion.  Results indicate that fire’s 
thermal effects constitute the largest impact and ultimately determine component 
survivability.  The use of computer-based simulation proves to be a valuable tool 
in the ultimate enhancement of electronic equipment tenability. 
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As electronic and computer technology continues to advance, its scope and 
application grows.  With this growth comes a torrent of calculation and data that 
lends itself to other needs such as processing, storage, retrieval, accessibility—
the  list is endless.  Within the context of the corporate world, the magnitude of 
these needs expands almost exponentially.  Thus enters an army of rack-
mounted computer and data storage systems aligned in rank and file performing 
their duties. 
 
Imagine yourself at the technological helm of a large corporation.  As manager of 
information systems, you are ultimately responsible for the storage and safety of 
hundreds or thousands of employees’ files and data sets.  For years, it has been 
business as usual.  Then, one day, someone notices a light on the fire alarm 
control panel.  Before anyone can say a word, the fire alarm claxon sounds and 
the building is evacuated.  Firefighters arrive on the scene and race into the 
entrances.  The atmosphere is charged with conversation and conjecture.  You 
wait for what seems an eternity when, suddenly, the “all clear” signal is sounded 
and you are permitted to re-enter the building.  You immediately head for the 
data center.  Upon entry, to your horror, you stare into the charred and sooty 
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remains of a once pristine computer room.  Two words echo hollowly in your 
head, “What happened?”  Sadly, without appropriate fire suppression and 
preventative measures, this scenario is an all-too-likely reality.    Whether 
initiated via human interaction, mechanical failure, electrical malfunction, or any 
of a myriad of possible sources, fire embodies just one of a computer data 
center’s most devastating foes.  Ironically, through mathematical and physical fire 
modeling, computers are now able to fight back.  With the aid of computer fire 
modeling, one can better visualize and understand the threats that fire presents 
to electronic equipment. 
 
1.2 Historical Context 
Although a distinction between corporate and household electrical fire 
significance can be drawn with respect to scale, in the end, both types result in 
physical and financial devastation.  To assist in bringing this threat into focus, 
one may turn to recorded fire data.  In household situations alone, Britain’s 1999 
fire census shows that 10% of all recorded fire occurrences originated with 
electrical equipment.  These fires account for 19% of the United Kingdom’s fire-
related injuries and are the most costly, averaging slightly more than $7,000 per 
incident [1].  Canada, in 2000, cites over 7,400 electrically-linked blazes totaling 
225,068,279 Canadian Dollars (CAD) [2].  Finally, in the United States, 
household electrical fires accounted for 38,300 fires in 1998.  These fires 
resulted in 284 deaths, 1,184 injuries, and $668.8 million in property damages 
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[3].  More recently, in 2000, U.S. public fire services recorded 1,708,000 fires 
causing approximately $11 billion in property damages.  Building structure fires 
account for 505,500 of these incidents and 5,800 are designated as office fires 
leading to an average of nearly $130 million in property damages.  Of these 
office fires, 37% were electrical in origin [1].  Bearing these statistics in mind, the 
vulnerability of data centers and seriousness of electrical and electronic fires may 
be readily seen via a brief inspection of historical case studies. 
 
Scenarios, like the aforementioned, have been documented world-wide for years.  
One excellent example of this surfaces in Illinois Bell’s Hinsdale Central Office 
fire affecting over 0.5 million customers [4].  Damaging only 60 minicomputers, 
the fire’s effects rippled on for almost 21-23 days and interrupted several 
hundred Chicago ATMs, a national motel’s regional reservation system, and 166 
thousand local and long distance telephone circuits [5].  Although the specific 
cause is still unknown, the battery backup power system was involved and 
resulted in an estimated 40-60 million dollars in damages in 1988 [6].  A chilling 
reality, as demonstrated in the Hinsdale office, is that the fire’s scale need not be 
large to cause significant damage or interruption of service.  Another, more 
recent, instance of destruction in a data center is The Treasury’s fire.  Serving as 
a leading economic and financial advising group in New Zealand, The Treasury 
experienced damages in July 1995 as their main computer room’s UPS 
(Uninterruptible Power Supply) ignited [7].  In case after case, computer fire 
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damage’s pervasiveness can be observed.  Additional examples include the 
1997 U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) [8], 1969 
Zurich-Hottingen telephone exchange [9], and 1988 Los Angeles First Interstate 
Bank Building [10] fires.  Although relatively benign in comparison, CECOM’s 
Research, Development and Engineering Center suffered computer room 
damages as a workstation erupted into flame [8].  In the Zurich-Hottingen case, 
extensive destruction resulted as PVC insulated cables burned and corrosive 
gases penetrated the building’s infrastructure including reinforced steel and 
concrete [9].  Finally, the First Interstate Bank blaze, labeled as “the high-rise fire 
you can’t put out” and requiring the combined efforts of 383 firefighters and 
paramedics for over 3.5 hours, destroyed five of the building’s 62 floors.  The 
fire’s origin is believed to be electrical in nature and resided near a number of 
personal computers [10].  However, computer data center fires are not solely 
limited to electrical equipment failure. 
 
Human error, vandalism/arson, and terrorist acts comprise additional threats to 
data centers.  Incidents of human error are typically as simple as incorrect 
cigarette disposal, unintentional fraying of an A/V cart’s extension cord, or a 
spilled beverage.  Although accidental, these mistakes have the potential to 
result in devastating loss.  Equally as destructive, albeit malicious in nature, are 
vandalism/arson and terrorism.  These themes introduce the element of criminal 
intent, but must be considered.  The premeditated incident at Penn Mutual Life 
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Insurance’s data processing facility depicts one such occasion.  Initial fire-
damage estimates totaled $8 million which included the loss of two IBM 3081 
mainframes, eleven DASD strings, and an unspecified quantity of 
microcomputers and peripherals [11].  Further illustrations include the 1993 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.  In this instance, non-thermal damage 
from smoke and corrosive fire products was documented throughout Tower One, 
including floors 16-90, and necessitated equipment restoration and replacement.  
In 1990, Karydas surveyed, itemized, and categorized a number of large-loss 
(greater than $1 million), non-thermal, fire-related property damage occurrences 
[12].  These instances and their resulting damages, involving electrical 
equipment (electrical), flammable/combustible materials (incendiary), tobacco 
smoking (smoking), and various other ignition sources (miscellaneous), are 
summarized in Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2.  This information shows that electrical 
systems account for over a third of the fires cited and an estimated $48 million in 
non-thermal damages alone. 
 
An additional point for consideration is that data center fires do not only result in 
physical loss.  Even when data is not lost, an unexpected fire can pit one against 
insurmountable odds.  Frequently, especially when unforgiving schedules are 
involved, a resultant loss of service may necessitate project outsourcing and can 
be more difficult to overcome than merely replacing equipment.  The National 
Weather Service’s 1999 computer room fire serves as an occasion where a  
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Table 1.2.1.  Fire Occurrences:  Ignition Source [12] 
Source Number of Incidents Percent of Total 
Electrical 10.5 35 
Incendiary 7.5 24 
Smoking 4.5 15 
Miscellaneous 4.0 13 





Table 1.2.2.  Fire Occurrences:  Property Damage [12] 







Electrical 10 48 33 41 
Textile 5.0 24 17 21 
Building/Equipment 8.5 20 28 17 
Merchandise 5.0 13 17 11 
Foodstuff 1.5 11 5 10 
Total 30 116 100 100 
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viable solution was achieved through an outsourcing arrangement after losing a 




This research investigates the realm of electrical and computer equipment fire 
tenability.  It begins with an overview of available information and provides 
historical context grounding.  The text then continues (in Chapter 2) with an 
explanation of the various types of computer fire hazards and explores current 
and previous fire suppression methodologies.  After reviewing the inherent 
dangers, Chapter 3, contains an overview of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology’s (NIST) software-based fire modeling and analysis tools—Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and Smokeview.  Chapter 4 outlines the specific 
investigative approach and model constructed (including observed parameters 
and assumptions).  Experimental data and outcomes are analyzed in Chapter 5.  







2.1 Computer Fire Hazards 
As alluded to previously, computer fire hazards are not merely limited to thermal 
exposure.  Although intense heat produced by combustion obviously poses a 
massive threat to the electronic hardware and storage media typically contained 
in a data center, additional dangers do exist.  These dangers include immediate 
and long-term damaging mechanisms alike.  The United States Department of 
Energy (DOE) organizes these hazards into three primary categories—heat, 
smoke corrosivity, and soot deposition [4]. 
 
Several factors play a part in determining a fire’s heat release rate.  These 
elements include the fuel’s chemical composition, the fuel’s orientation, the 
room’s size and shape, and the room’s vent arrangement.  Objects within the 
room are viewed from the fire’s perspective as additional fuel sources or targets.  
Thermal damage can be attributed directly to flame impingement, radiative heat 
flux, and convection.  As a fire continues to burn, its plume forms an upper layer 
of heated gases.  The flames, upper gas layer, compartment walls, and heated 
surfaces are all sources of radiative heat.  Additionally, if a target is immersed 
within the upper gases, convection increases the thermal intensity and 
subsequent damage.  For materials typically contained in a data center, heat 
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fluxes of less than 10 kW/m2 will not incur auto-ignition [4].  However, 
temperatures of 79.4°C (175°F) are high enough to damage functioning 
computer equipment [14].  These heat levels are also sufficient to cause plastic 
elements such as keyboards, PVC conduits, monitors, cable insulations, printers, 
or tape backup media to melt or deform.  As evidenced by the 1988 Harwell tests 
conducted in the U.K., computer tapes provide a ready fuel source that enables 
fires of particularly-high ferocity and tenacity to develop [5].  One source states 
that temperatures of 75°C (165°F) will ruin tapes and disk packs while 
temperatures of 55°C (133°F) will damage diskette media [15].  The National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) sets the bar even lower, citing destructive 
temperatures as low as 37.8°C (100°F) for magnetic and flexible media, with 
possible successful reconditioning up to 48.9°C (120°F), and 65.6°C (150°F) for 
disc media [14].  Reconditioning efforts typically involve physical media 
extraction, cleaning, drying, and duplication within a contaminant-free 
environment.  In the event that temperatures exceed the ignition points of 
flammable materials within the compartment, flashover occurs.  In either a direct 
flame impingement or a flashover scenario, it is unlikely that any electronic or 
computer equipment will survive.  However, flammable materials aren’t the only 
objects capable of sustaining damage.  Inflammable objects, such as metallic 
racks, computer cases, and hard drives, may still experience mechanical 
stressing and physical deformation.  Factory Mutual’s established thermal 
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thresholds conclude that significant thermal damage may result at temperatures 
of 175°F (79°C) and malfunction at 140°F (60°C)  [16]. 
 
One of the less immediate sources of damage is that of corrosion.  Operating on 
the molecular level, the corrosive effects of a fire are more difficult to assess and 
may not be immediately evaluated.  Table 2.1.1 provides a listing of the various 
types, descriptions, common locations, and causes of corrosion commonly 
involved.  With the introduction of integrated circuits (ICs), the component scale 
is drastically reduced.  As computer technology continues to evolve, circuits and 
their interconnects are becoming smaller and more compact.  Therefore, as 
these minimizing efforts continue, even a small amount of corrosion can affect a 
large number of circuit bridges, solder joints, IC packages, and even the circuit 
board itself.  From an engineering perspective, these corrosive effects result in 
compromises in circuit integrity leading to metal loss, reduced conductivity, 
current leaks, short circuits, and system failure.  However, to an end user, these 
same effects manifest themselves in the form of component discoloration, 
“glitchy” operation, data corruption or loss, frustration, and ultimately, repair 
costs.  Given the combustible materials commonly present in computer and 
electronic equipment (e.g. wiring insulation, PVC, polymethylmethacrylate 
(PMMA), and various plastics), the generation of a number of corrosive agents is 
possible.  Even small quantities of burning PVC may produce environments 
capable of damaging electronic equipment [17].  Typical toxic pyrolysis agents 
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Table 2.1.1.  Types of Corrosion [18-22] 
Type Description Location Cause 
Pitting 
Localized surface 





of corrosive agent on 
surface 
Crevice 
Similar to pitting, 







within small area 
Uniform Equally-distributed surface corrosion Entire surface 
Even distribution of 
corrosive agent on 
surface 
Two-Metal 
In corrosive agent, 
more corrosion-
resistant metal 
corrodes slower and 
less resistant faster 
than if separate 
Two dissimilar 
metal junction 
Electron flow is 
enhanced at junction 
Stress 
Material under tensile 












include hydrochloric acid (HCl), hydrofluoric acid (HF), hydrobromic acid (HBr), 
nitric acid (HNO3), sulfuric acid (H2SO4), carbolic acid/phenol (C6H5OH), and 
acetic acid (CH3COOH) [4].  Table 2.1.2 lists some typical acid-forming gases 
and their corrosive potential airborne concentrations. 
 
Perhaps, the most common corrosive agent found in fires of this nature is HCl.  
In reality, gas concentrations have been shown to be lower than theoretical yields 
[23, 24].  In the case of HCl, for example, concentrations do not typically exceed 
200-300 ppm.  Clean equipment chloride contaminant concentrations are 
anticipated to be at or less than 10 µg/in2 and are typically 30-60 µg/in2 after 20 
years [4].  These typical levels, however, are further refined depending on 
organizational use.  For example, equipment is classified as “clean” with a 
chloride level of 14-17 µg/in2 for the military; less than 14 µg/in2 for IBM; and less 
than 20 µg/in2 for Honeywell.  In spite of this variation, it is commonly accepted 
that chloride contamination levels of 30-50 µg/in2 dictate consideration for 
reclamation [4].  Chloride contamination reconditioning falls into levels:  less than 
200 µg/in2, 200-600 µg/in2, and greater than 600 µg/in2 where less than 30 µg/in2 
is considered a typical background concentration [25].  Categorical transitions 
represent drastic increases in expense and difficulty.  Similarly, acceptable 
sulfate contamination levels have been established at less than 65 µg/in2 [4].  
However, even trace amounts of corrosive agents may yield troublesome, if not  
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Table 2.1.2.  Corrosive Potential Airborne Concentrations [26] 
Gas Acid (name) Acid (formula) Concentration (ppm) 
HCl Hydrochloric HCl 100 
HF Hydrofluoric HF 100 
NO2 Nitrous HNO2 100 
NO2 Nitric HNO3 100 
SO2 Sulfuric H2SO4 1,000 




disastrous, results over time.  Table 2.1.3 summarizes general contaminant 
levels, typical environmental conditions, and expected effects. 
 
Although corrosive gas production is directly related to the type and quantity of 
fuel source involved, studies have shown that increased heat and even fire 
retardant additives may actually enhance a fire’s corrosive effects [27].  
Ultimately, four factors shape the toxins’ resultant yields.  These elements are: 
up to 25% of the ions are trapped in charred portions of the target; 25% or more 
of the ions condense near the fire; soot affects ion release and absorption; and 
finally, the gases tend to decay in the atmosphere [4].  Lastly, a compartment’s 
humidity serves as a source of enhancement for the corrosive effectiveness of 
harmful gases.  Excessive humidity levels will result in higher corrosive potential.  
Acting alone, humidity levels of 85% or more will damage magnetic media [15].  
However, minimal humidity levels encourage static electricity—a potentially more 
deadly foe where electronics are concerned.  Therefore, electronic salvage 
processes typically establish guidelines for environments with relative humidity 
levels of 30% [28]. 
 
A third, and final, fire hazard class is soot deposition.  Defined as “particulate 
materials composed of … carbon, resins, tar, and unburnt fuel,” soot production 
is a direct function of the fuel source, burning environment, and duration of burn 
[4].  Soot can be viewed as the airborne “filth” of a fire resulting in discoloration,  
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Table 2.1.3.  Effects of Contamination [4] 







Above 77 Above 500 
Very reactive; 
Humidity >50%; Hot 









Above 30 Above 200 
Reactive; Humidity 







Above 16 Above 100 
Factory environment; 






















mechanical damage, and electrical shorting of equipment.  Its production may be 
approximated via a ratio of masses of smoke versus fuel.  Typical yields range 
from 0.05 to 0.15 kg per kg of fuel [4].  Due to the incomplete combustion 
coexistent with low-temperature fires, higher amounts of soot would be expected 
in fires possessing a lower heat flux than that of more blistering conflagrations.  
This particulate matter typically affects exposed, mechanical elements such as 
cooling fans; floppy, magnetic tape, and optical drives; switching relays; analog 
meters; and peripherals.  It can also alter the effectiveness of thermal dissipaters 
(heat sinks) and constitute a potential fire risk.  Measured via Total Petroleum 
Content (TPC), clean electronic equipment is typically rated at a level of 5 µg/in2 
while equipment exceeding values of 50-100 µg/in2 is cause for concern [29].  As 
a point of reference, post-fire measurements of soot, chloride, and halogen acid 
contamination may exceed 5000 µg/in2 [4]. 
 
Based on DOE data, Table 2.1.4 itemizes source, projected temperature range, 
possible heat flux, and anticipated level of damage for the three primary fire-
related hazards.  Individually, any of the three fire-related hazards (heat, 
corrosion, or soot deposition) possesses the potential to dispatch disaster to 
electronic equipment.  Working in concert, as is common in a fire scenario, these 
three elements most certainly thrive in ruin. 
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Table 2.1.4.  Thermal Damage Thresholds [4] 




90-100 (typical) Unsalvageable 
Upper gas layer Room temp. – 1,000 (postflashover) Variable 





Soot/Corrosive Gas Lower temps. (e.g., 50) Variable 





While the focus of this research is equipment rather than human tenability, it is 
not uncommon for personnel to be present when a fire erupts.  An employee’s or 
fire fighter’s ability to function may play a critical role in a data center’s ultimate 
survival.  Therefore, Appendix A contains additional information related to human 
fire risks. 
 
2.2 Suppression Systems 
Now that the most common damaging aspects of a fire have been explored, this 
section investigates the previous and prospective approaches implemented in 
dousing a blaze.  It is a startling fact that nearly 50% of computer room fires 
actually begin outside the room itself [30].  It is, therefore, imperative that the 
entire building in which a data center is housed be protected by a fire 
extinguishing system.  Even so, one might assume that an effective means of 
extinguishing a fire is all that is required to protect a data center and its 
equipment.  This supposition, however, is incorrect.  Suppression is merely the 
first gambit in a strategic game against time and the forces of nature. 
 
Fire suppression brings with it a myriad of challenges and trade offs.  Initial 
attempts at electronic fire suppression paralleled the development of the bucket 
brigade by pitting a fire against gallons of its arch foe, water.  Elaborate piping 
systems began to spring up in data centers everywhere transporting gallons of 
water to the inferno.  However, this strategy revealed an immediate opportunity 
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for process improvement.  Unless equipment is specifically intended for wet 
environments, shorting will occur if it is energized [31].  Therefore, the first step in 
extinguishing a data center fire is typically to de-energize the electrical 
equipment.  Ultimately, there are two classes of water-based sprinkler systems—
wet pipe and dry pipe.  A wet pipe system is composed of a grid of fusible-link 
sprinkler heads connected by iron piping that is filled with water at all times.  A 
dry pipe system boasts the same grid structure, but possesses an additional 
water release valve that separates it from its water supply.  Instead of water, the 
piping in a dry pipe system is initially filled with compressed gas (typically air or 
nitrogen) until a fire is detected and the water release valve is opened.  Both 
systems hold advantages and disadvantages.  These virtues and shortcomings 
are cataloged in Table 2.2.1 
 
Although commonplace, both types of sprinkler systems are limited by three 
factors:  relatively slow reaction time, quantity and method of extinguishment, 
and installation flexibility.   Commonly rated at 71.1°C (160°F), sprinkler heads 
may allow surrounding air temperatures to reach as high as 260°C (500°F) [32].  
Secondly, once a sprinkler system is activated, it must be shut down manually.  
This allows for excessive amounts of (possibly dirty) water to spew onto 
electronic equipment.  Lastly, due to their method of operation, sprinkler systems 
are typically limited to ceiling-level installation and don’t excel in the protection of 
plenums above the ceiling or below the floor. 
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Table 2.2.1.  Wet and Dry Pipe Sprinkler Systems [32] 
Type Advantage Disadvantage 
Wet Pipe Fast-acting; More common; Simplicity; Cheaper 
“Dirty” water; Temperature 
sensitivity (freezing); Fast-











In an effort to improve response time and accuracy of activation, a myriad of 
sensing and detection schemes are used to augment sprinkler systems.  
Although three primary types of detectors exist, heat, fire/smoke (photoelectric 
and ionization), and air sampling, only two are employed to give a data center its 
ability to identify fire [32].  Because heat detectors are slower to react, a 
suppression system relying on them for activation would allow a fire to grow too 
large.  Therefore, fire and air sampling detectors provide the higher level of 
effectiveness necessitated in an electronic environment.  Within the realm of 
smoke detectors, the photoelectric variety more aptly recognizes thicker, darker 
smoke.  Meanwhile, ionization detectors are responsive to the hot gases of 
combustion.  Hence, both types are frequently used jointly to enhance the 
chance of fire discovery.  Air sampling detectors, although more expensive, offer 
much higher sensitivity.  Sporting a single chemical analysis element, multiple 
plastic or copper tubes extend to and terminate in areas of concern.  Air samples 
are then pulled into the analyzer for examination.  Through cross zoning (multiple 
types of sensors in one area) or additive (suppression requires multiple sensor 
activations) arrangements, highly elaborate fire detection systems may be 
constructed. 
 
Although addressing the issue of response time, the addition of sensors and 
detectors does nothing to alleviate a sprinkler system’s installation limitations.  
Therefore, gaseous agents with enhanced penetrative abilities enter the scene.  
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Carbon dioxide (CO2) seemed an ideal total flooding alternative to water.  By 
removing the oxygen necessary for combustion, carbon dioxide simply smothers 
a fire.  However, at the concentrations required to extinguish a fire, typically 30%-
40%, carbon dioxide also smothers humans which require a minimum of 18% 
oxygen to breathe.  As a result, carbon dioxide systems are typically equipped 
with a 90 second pre-activation alarm.  This fact, in concert with 10 minute 
extinguishing times and icy blast damage, undermined carbon dioxide’s 
usefulness [15].  Therefore, its use has been relegated to localized applications 
and portable fire extinguishers. 
 
In an effort to find a less toxic, yet electronic-friendly, gaseous total flooding 
agent, the halogens were enlisted.  Occupying group seventeen of the periodic 
table (Figure 2.2.1), halogens contain seven electrons in their outer shell and 
form salts [33].  When a select number of the hydrogen atoms found in 
hydrocarbons are replaced by members of the halogen family, a halogenated 
hydrocarbon (also known as a halon) is produced [32].  However, as all isotopes 
of astatine are radioactive, it is not amenable to this application [34].  Possessing 
suitable properties (Table 2.2.2), the two derivative agents most commonly 
employed in electronic fire suppression are Halon 1211 
(bromochlorodifluoromethane, CF2ClBr) and Halon 1301 (bromotrifluoromethane, 
CBrF3) [35].  Halon 1211 is two times more effective than carbon dioxide as a 








Table 2.2.2.  Halon Properties [32] 
Type Boiling Point Common Properties Common Use 
Halon 1211 25°F Portable Extinguisher 
Halon 1301 -70°F 
Gas at room 
temp.; Leave little 







and can be directed and streamed onto a fire from a distance of ten feet or more.  
However, with its lower boiling point and smaller concentrations necessary to 
extinguish a fire (approximately 5-7%), Halon 1301 serves as a more effective 
total flooding agent [32].  Unlike carbon dioxide, Halon 1301 does not rely on 
“flame cooling” or “oxygen exclusion” to extinguish a fire.  Instead, it interacts 
with the transient combustion products chemically to halt flame propagation [36].  
Therefore, the maintenance of adequate Halon 1301 fire-stopping concentrations 
is critical and it is recommended that a room be well sealed.  In fact, due to poor 
sealing and lack of enclosure integrity tests, the NFPA once calculated that over 
50% of the halon installations in the United States alone may be ineffective [15].  
In an attempt to compensate for possible compartment leakage, halon flooding 
systems are typically designed to provide 8-10% concentrations to ensure that, 
after 10-15 minutes, the necessary 5-7% concentration remains [32].  Under 
proper conditions, Halon 1301 systems are capable of extinguishing a fire in 60 
seconds and normal operation may resume after a brief ventilation period of two 
hours [30].  However, it is a sobering fact that only 1 in 10 halon discharges 
actually suppresses a fire with minimal damage [5].  Perhaps the most significant 
benefit of Halon 1301 is its improved treatment of humans.  Although it is not 
side-effect free, at requisite levels, Halon 1301 will not suffocate people like 
carbon dioxide.  However, typical symptoms do include dizziness, cardiovascular 
problems, or respiratory discomfort that will pass with the introduction of fresh  
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air [32].  In extreme concentrations, higher than 10%, some individuals may 
suffer from irregular heartbeats or central nervous system disorders [30]. 
 
Although Halon 1301 once appeared to be a panacea for computer-based fire 
extinguishment, its expense and additional corrosive and atmospheric concerns 
have turned the tide.  Halon fire suppressants, unfortunately, contribute to the 
production of harmful corrosive gases mentioned earlier.  Hydrogen fluoride (HF) 
and hydrogen bromide (HBr), for example, produce deleterious results when 
exposed to printed circuit board protective coatings.  Furthermore, the types of 
components attached to circuit boards impact equipment failure rate.  In 
particular, CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) samples fail more 
readily than NMOS (negative-channel metal oxide semiconductor) and TTL 
(transistor transistor logic) circuits [37].  However, it is of interest to note that 
magnetic tape seems to posses more resilience to halogenated atmospheres.  In 
tests performed by Ansul, DuPont, Cardox, and Fenwal, hydrogen fluoride 
concentrations of less than 294 ppm and hydrogen bromide levels of less than 39 
ppm did not appear to negatively affect recorded magnetic tape [17].  However, 
halons also act as de-greasers and will, over time, result in data loss by 
weakening the bond between the tape’s Mylar backing and data layer [5].  
Another critically important factor is halon’s negative environmental impact.  
Halon, similar to that of chlorinated fluorocarbons (CFCs) used in aerosol 
propellants, some solvents, and Freon refrigerants, promotes the deterioration of 
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Earth’s ozone layer.  In fact, with ozone depletion potentials of 10 for Halon 1301 
and 3 for Halon 1211, as compared to 0.5 for common CFCs, halon is actually 
more aggressive [15].  After recognizing this fact, almost 50 nations (including 
the United States) established the Montreal Protocol of 1987.  It outlines taxation 
and usage-reduction guidelines on CFCs (including halon) resulting in near total 
abandonment by 2005 [32].  Shortly after the Montreal Protocol was established, 
halon consumption dropped substantially.  Oddly enough, this decline is primarily 
attributed to the use of alternate test methods and the reduction of discharge 
checks during system installation.  Appendix B contains an at-a-glance 
comparative summary of the advantages and disadvantages of water-based and 
Halon 1301-based extinguishing systems. 
 
Today, various hybridized systems are being employed to ensure computer room 
protection.  Typical combinations include gas-water hybrids where sprinklers are 
arranged for maximum in-room coverage and gaseous agents (both carbon 
dioxide and halon) augment system effectiveness within plenum spaces and 
select areas where damage and exposure risks are low.  Another modern fire 
suppression technique that has been gaining recognition is water misting.  With 
testing in Heritage Buildings, prospective application in telecommunications 
facilities, and interest from organizations such as the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), the Factory Mutual (FM), and a host of others (Appendix C), 
water mist systems may become the next hope for computer rooms as well.  
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Operating in a similar fashion to existing water-based sprinkler systems, mist 
systems produce much smaller water droplets that aggregate to form a dense 
fog.  Water droplet sizes are typically on the order of 300-400 microns, but may 
be smaller than 10-30 microns [38].  Another factor benefiting electronic 
equipment, research has shown that a fire’s smoke plume is typically more 
conductive than the suppressing water mist [39].  This reduces the potential of 
arcing damage before equipment is de-energized.  Although somewhat arbitrarily 
defined, water mist systems may be divided into four categories:  high pressure 
(7,000 kPa/1,000 psi) with extremely fine droplets, intermediate pressure (690 
kPa/100 psi) with high flow, low flow (being tested for aircraft use), and 
pneumatic (gas-assisted atomization) systems [40].  Demonstration testing 
performed by the U.K., Europe, and the U.S. have shown that water mist nozzles 
may be effective in suppressing fire outbursts, especially when placed within 
electronic equipment racks or between open-door cabinet aisle ways [41].  In 
fact, tests conducted by Kidde-Fenwal, GTE, and FSI Research demonstrated 
that, under specific conditions, it is possible to extinguish vertical rack printed 
circuit board fires within one to two seconds using less than one liter (0.26 
gallons) of water [39].  However, misting still suffers from two daunting 
unknowns:  the most successful process involved in extinguishing a fire and the 
most effective manner of ensuring correct droplet size and transport [40].  It is 
clear that standardization and testing is needed.  In fact, the NFPA defers to full-
scale testing as the only reliable method of testing to ensure effectiveness [41].  
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However, water misting is not without weakness.  Table 2.2.3 identifies potential 
human safety advantages and concerns of water mist systems.  Although water 
mist systems may possess great potential, progress has been slow due to 
wavering commitment and the existence of other suppression systems. 
 
Equipped with an arsenal of destruction including heat, corrosion, and soot, fire 
can bring about disaster where electronic equipment is concerned.  Fire damage 
may manifest itself immediately, as in cases of direct flame impingement, or over 
great lengths of time, where corrosion is encountered.  Although fire detection 
and suppression systems provide a method of battling fires once they occur, a 
preemptive means of modeling possible fire scenarios and predicting hazards is 
even more desirable.  This type of prognostic environment is precisely where 
computer fire modeling software tools come into play. 
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Table 2.2.3.  Human Safety Advantages and Concerns of Water Mist [40] 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Cool gas temperatures 
• Remove toxins and soot from 
smoke-filled environment 
• Acidic gases combined with smaller 
droplets may allow deep respiratory 
transport 
• Steam-type injuries possible 
• Reduced visibility possible due to 







3.1 Description and Requirements 
Since National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) public release of 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) Version 1 in February 2000, the field of computer 
fire modeling has advanced substantially.  This advancement has resulted in the 
subsequent releases of Version 2 (December 2001) and Version 3.1 (April 15th, 
2003) [42, 43].  These versions, as well as pre-release Version 4, may currently 
be downloaded from NIST’s FDS and Smokeview download page 
(http://fire.nist.gov/fds/refs/download.htm).  Based on the Fortran and C 
programming languages, FDS will function on multiple computing platforms.  
Several pre-compiled versions already exist for Microsoft Windows or 
UNIX/Linux-based machines.  However, NIST also provides the source code for 
compilation and porting to additional operating systems. 
 
Although the FDS software package exists as a single, installable package, it is 
in fact, a combination of two extremely powerful programs.  The components are 
individually recognized as FDS and Smokeview.  NIST succinctly defines FDS as 
“a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow” [42].  
Simply stated, FDS performs the intense mathematical calculations involved in 
simulating a fire-based environment.  FDS exists as a command-line-driven 
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program that requires an input file used to describe the fire scenario.  This data 
file includes parameters such as room and target dimensions, materials, reaction 
type, and calculation parameters.  Its companion piece, Smokeview, provides a 
three dimensional graphical user interface (GUI) typically used to view FDS’s 
simulation output.  In recent versions, Smokeview has been enhanced and 
endowed with the ability to assist in rapid, point-and-click type generation of fire 
scenes. 
 
The software’s minimum computer requirements are stated as a 1 GHz Pentium 
III (or equivalent) with 512 MB of RAM [42].  Although these requirements are not 
outlandish by today’s standards, they are important.  Processor speed and 
memory are two of the largest bottlenecks in performing FDS fire calculations 
and are directly tied to simulation completion time.  It may be obvious that a 
faster processor results in faster calculations.  However, inadequate memory 
sizes will slow even the fastest CPU.  As additional calculations occur, further 
memory is required.  Once the portion of RAM allocated to FDS (directly 
determined by the total system memory capacity) is filled, the memory contents 
are temporarily stored on the hard drive.  This process is known as “swapping” 
and is one method of virtually increasing a computer’s memory capacity.  
However, this process bogs a computer by increasing its operational overhead.  
Larger system memory configurations will reduce instances of data swapping.  
Two additional computer hardware considerations are hard drive storage and 
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video card functionality.  As stated in the FDS user’s manual, depending on 
complexity, it is not uncommon for a single simulation to require one gigabyte (or 
more) of storage for output files [42].  A simulation’s complexity is affected by a 
number of factors including:  computational grid scale, fire size, reaction, and 
whether or not supplemental elements such as boundary, slice/vector, particle, 
isosurface, or PLOT3D files are generated.  As is common in the realm of 
computers, faster machines with larger amounts of memory and storage are 
better suited for the task at hand. 
 
3.2 Editing 
Armed with an understanding of appropriate syntax (detailed in the FDS User’s 
Guide), the process of creating and editing an input file is relatively 
straightforward.  In addition to learning FDS syntax, it is also extremely helpful to 
know the FDS standard naming conventions, as shown in Figure 3.2.1.  Although 
not a requirement, input files typically end with a “.data” extension and define a 
fire scenario, as previously mentioned.  The FDS database is an additional 
source file possessing the “.data” extension.  Serving as more of an informational 
repository, the database file is included in the FDS installation and need not be 
edited.  Instead, it includes material and reaction-specific information used in 
performing the fire simulation.  These files are merely text files and may be 




Figure 3.2.1.  FDS Naming Conventions [44] 
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 Word, etc.).  After the file has been created and the fire scenario has been 
sufficiently described, simulation may begin. 
 
3.3 Simulation 
The act of FDS simulation is also straightforward, assuming a few guidelines are 
followed.  As a command-line tool, FDS begins when instantiated via the fds3 
executable file.  However, when called, it does not know the input file name.  
Therefore, the input data file must be specified when FDS is called.  This is 
accomplished with a command-line operator and looks like fds3 < inputfile.data.  
The less than sign is actually a data redirection operator that sends the input 
data to FDS.  While simulating, FDS generates output including simulation 
dimensions, time step, parameter calculation, run time messages, and various 
other values.  By default, this output is directed to the screen where it streams by 
and scrolls into oblivion.  However, the default screen output can be redirected, 
in a similar fashion to the input data, to an output data file via a greater than 
symbol.  Following convention, the output file typically ends with a “.out” 
extension.  All of these operations, the FDS call, input file redirect, and output file 
redirect, may be accomplished simultaneously on the same command line.  The 
final resulting statement is fds3 < inputfile.data > outputfile.out. 
 
In addition to aforementioned screen output, depending on user specifications, 
FDS may generate a number of data files as shown in Figure 3.2.1.  The 
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Smokeview input file is always generated and serves as the connecting link 
between FDS and Smokeview.  Once executed, Smokeview is capable of 
opening files with the “.smv” extension and may be directed to load and display 
any combination of generated FDS output files associated with a particular 
simulation.  These output files include slice/vector slice, boundary, particle, 
isosurface, and PLOT3D files.  Both types of slice files (slice and vector) are 
positioned via an X, Y, or Z axis location and record cross-sectional simulation 
data along their specified planar location.  Their primary difference is that vector 
slice files represent direction of motion using vector-based arrows.  Boundary 
files store surface measurements for the compartment’s walls and its contents.  
Particle files are used to track particle movement including water vapor and 
element flow.  Isosurfaces typically record a fire’s heat release rate per unit area 
and its mixture fraction (division of smoke and fire).  Lastly, PLOT3D files provide 
simulation snapshots at predefined intervals.  In addition to the documented 
output files, FDS also generates comma-separated-value files denoted by a 
“.csv” extension.  Similar to the scenario input data file, the comma-separated-
value files store simulation measurements in plain text format.  Therefore, these 
files may easily be imported into other programs for further analysis. 
 
3.4 Computational Software Model 
A detailed analysis of computational fluid dynamic (CFD) theory is beyond the 
scope of this research.  However, this section serves as a cursory introduction to 
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the fundamentals involved in FDS’s computational software model.  Further detail 
and thorough analysis may be found in the FDS Technical Reference Guide [45]. 
 
Historically, initial attempts at fire simulation revolved around zone-based fire 
models.  In these representations, a combustion environment is divided into two 
homogenous levels, a heated upper layer and a cool lower layer, and 
calculations are performed independently in each layer via algebraic or 
differential equations.  Further information may be found as Quintiere chronicles 
the zone model’s progress through 1983 [46].  Although zone models enjoy 
widespread implementation, they are limited in that they don’t allow for “detailed 
spatial distributions of physical properties” and can not be systematically 
improved [42]. 
 
The next evolution in computational fire modeling involves the first CFD field 
models.  These models are almost entirely based on work performed by 
Patankar and Spalding [47].  Specifically, the techniques involved rely on the k—
ε turbulence model where k is the turbulent kinetic energy (TKE) and ε is the TKE 
dissipation rate.  This model is most commonly cited in Patankar and Spalding’s 
SIMPLE and SIMPLER methods which implement Poisson equations for 




A more refined version of the field models, the Large Eddy Simulation (LES) CFD 
model forms the underpinnings of FDS simulation.  This methodology finds its 
grounding in the fundamental Navier-Stokes equations.  Explicitly, a simplified 
version of the Navier-Stokes equations developed by Rehm and Baum, referred 
to as the “low Mach number” combustion equations, is exploited to reduce 
computation times.  This simplification is realized by filtering out large acoustic 
variations in temperature and density and results in an elliptic quality that is more 
characteristic of low-speed convective processes [45]. 
 
Established by the user in a scenario’s input data file, FDS divides the fire 
compartment into smaller, more manageable regions.  These regions, or grid 
cells, determine the resolution of a fire scenario.  FDS calculations occur inside 
each cell of the scenario’s computational grid, are assumed to be uniform within 
a particular cell, and vary only with time [45].  Beginning with the conservative 
equations of mass, species, momentum, and energy, NIST uses an 
approximation of the ideal gas law to relate thermodynamic values.  This 
approximation is referred to as an equation of state and divides overall pressure 
into three components, background, hydrostatic, and flow-induced perturbation.  
However, it is noted that the latter two components are relatively small and the 
background pressure typically dominates.  It should be recognized that the 
energy conservation equation is not directly solved.  Instead, its terms give rise to 
 
39 
the divergence constraint equation.  Therefore, the resulting simulation equations 
are: 
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and variable descriptions are included in Appendix D [45].  Before continuing, a 
few mathematical symbols must be discussed.  First, the gradient or grad 
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ρρρρ .  When applied to vectors, the gradient 
results in a tensor or vector whose magnitude is directionally dependent.  













uuu)( uu .  The divergence function is only 
valid for vector values and produces a scalar quantity [49].  Armed with these 
definitions, the previously-mentioned equations may now be explored.  The 
conservation of mass equation is represented as a material derivative (
t∂
∂ρ ) and 
relies on the time rate of change in a material particle’s density (ρ) within the 
three-dimensional space defined by the velocity vector (u).  This constraint 
ensures that material is neither created nor destroyed through the process of 
combustion.  In addition to previously mentioned variables, the species 
conservation equation preserves ingredient balance throughout the compartment 
by considering volumetric production rate ( im ′′′& ), elemental mass fractions (Yi), 
and diffusion coefficient (D).  The left portion of the equivalence describes 
species accumulation due to density change and species inflow and outflow.  
Meanwhile, the right portion counters with species inflow and outflow due to 
diffusion and elemental production rates.  Conservation of momentum provides a 
velocity and pressure coupling to preserve momentum within the fluidic 
representation.  Momentum-altering affects caused by the environment’s vorticity 
(ω), viscosity ( τ ), gravity (g), and external forces excluding gravity (f) are 
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accounted for.  Also notice that variations in applicable gravitational forces due to 
changes in material density and existing particle velocities are represented.  The 
divergence constraint calculates and limits particle flow deviation through the 
combination of the material derivative, conservation of mass, and conservation of 
energy terms.  The integral term accounts for reaction enthalpy by assuming 
constant specific heat over the temperature range.  The assumption of 
temperature-independent specific heat only results in the exclusion of minor 
divergence terms while greatly reducing calculation costs [45].  Lastly, the 
equation of state establishes an equivalency between background pressure at a 
given time, p0(t), and the product of density (ρ), temperature (T), and the 
universal gas constant (ℜ ) divided by material mass (M).  The low Mach number 
equations assume that density and temperature are inversely proportional.  It 
should also be recognized that the product of density and volume yields mass 
(ρV = M).  This relation, in conjunction with the equation of state, roughly 
resolves to the ideal gas law (PV = nℜ T), differing only by the number of moles 
of gas (n).  In practice, FDS also uses the equation of state to calculate 
temperature. 
 
Within the realm of fire simulation, software tools serve as an excellent means of 
fire hazard analysis.  One such program that has been shown, through practical 
experimentation, to be particularly adept at modeling fire scenarios is NIST’s Fire 
Dynamics Simulator.  In conjunction with its visualization counterpart, 
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Smokeview, FDS can provide tremendous amounts of data and insight.  This 
information may be used to investigate, verify, augment or, in some cases, 







With the intent of demonstrating damage potential and exploring aspects of 
layout and design, the subsequent investigation considers various facets of data 
center fire hazards.  These elements include possible post-fire outcomes and 
methods of suppression.  This exploration is facilitated through the 
implementation of NIST’s Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) software package 
discussed in Chapter 3.  Through these simulations, a clearer understanding of 
data center fire vulnerability can be gleaned. 
 
4.2 Assumptions 
Because a fire’s inception possesses a single point of origin before spreading, 
the data center combustion model constructed in this study is simplified to a 
single rack-mounted computer system.  Enhancing the model’s flexibility, this 
evaluation allows for the simulation of behavior and pyrolysis product generation 
related to a single electronic unit.  Additional fuel loads, such as supplementary 
rack systems or wiring interconnects, may then be considered individually or as 
targets of preliminary flame propagation.  The previous analysis has shown that 
the first step in any effective computer room fire suppression system is to shunt 
electrical power to the compartment and disengage ventilation systems.  
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Therefore, it was unnecessary to model damage incurred by electrical arcing or 
forced-air draft environments.  Finally, to ensure maximum available fuel 
exposure, the upper surface of the lowest circuit board was selected as the point 
of ignition.  These assumptions help to establish a theoretical worst-case 
scenario after fire detection. 
 
4.3 Experimental Model 
The selected experimental model represents a vertical, rack-mount computer 
enclosure characteristic of a data center.  This particular cabinet contains six 
individual circuit board tray divisions and is constructed of steel.  Paralleling 
previous small-scale fire tests performed by NIST [50], PMMA is chosen as an 
adequate representation of a typical printed circuit board fuel load.  The data 
center walls are represented as concrete structures consistent with typical 
construction. 
 
Both unsuppressed (free burn) and water suppressed simulations are 
implemented.  The factors dictating sprinkler effectiveness are droplet size and 
distribution, momentum of spray, ceiling clearance, and magnitude of fire [51]. 
Due to water mist’s infancy and implementation variation, an adequate 
standardized model of a misting sprinkler, including droplet size and distribution, 
is unavailable.  Therefore, for its extended coverage potential, the default Central 
K-11 sprinkler is implemented within the various suppression tests (Appendix E).  
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Finally, based on projected methods of extinguishment, an in-cabinet fire 
suppression system is implemented. 
 
4.4 Parameters 
For layout purposes, the FDS coordinate system is based on a three-dimensional 
Cartesian grid composed of X, Y, and Z axes.  The physical enclosure was 
modeled as a 2.5 m x 3.0 m x 3.0 m (8.20 ft. x 9.84 ft. x 9.84 ft.) area.  These 
dimensions established a compartment space large enough to visualize products 
of combustion while simultaneously allowing for the observation of radiative and 
convective effects via boundary conditions.  The steel rack-mount cabinet was 
centered in the room and measured 0.7 m x 0.6 m x 2.0 m (2.30 ft. x 1.97 ft. x 
6.56 ft.).  Each of the six circuit boards was 0.6 m x 0.6 m x 0.005 m (23.62 in. x 
23.62 in. x 0.20 in.) in dimension.  Thermocouples were placed 10 cm (3.94 in.) 
in front of each circuit board.  Both circuit boards and thermocouples were 
labeled from one through six beginning with those at the lowest Z-axis value.  To 
ensure adequate fidelity, a 50 cell x 60 cell x 120 cell computational grid was 
established.  This resulted in an array of 360,000 cells measuring 5 cm x 5 cm x 
2.5 cm (1.97 inches x 1.97 inches x 0.98 inches).  As a side note, these 
specifications resulted in average processing times of one to almost three weeks 
on a 2.8 GHz Pentium 4 equivalent machine with 1 Gigabyte of memory.  The 




Figure 4.4.1.  Compartment Design 
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Based on previous analysis, telecommunication facility fires typically commence 
with 5-10 kW potentials [52].  In comparison, small trash can fires may generate 
heat release rates of more than 15 kW [53] and typically reach rates of 100 kW.  
Therefore, a worst-case-scenario heat release rate of 10 kW was initially 
selected and expanded upon.   For comparative purposes, fires were defined in 
two manners.  The first method implemented FDS’s vent syntax and established 
a fire over a portion of a circuit board.  Subsequent tests employed FDS’s 
surface syntax to define a broader site of combustion that covered the entire 
upper surface of a circuit board.  Suppressed and unsuppressed tests were 
performed under each scheme.  A summary of the set of experimental fire 
simulations is contained in Table 4.4.1.  Within this table, suppression posture is 
defined by the sprinkler’s physical location within the cabinet followed by its spray 
orientation.  Therefore, a designation of “back aimed forward” may be read such 
that a sprinkler was positioned at the rear of the cabinet and aimed outward 
(parallel to the compartment floor) toward the thermocouples.  Due to cabinet 
symmetry, sprinklers placed on the right side and aimed left could just as easily 
be interpreted as being placed on the left side and aimed right.  However, as 
computer cabinets are typically arranged side-by-side in rows, data center 
layouts are more accommodating of rear-mounted fire suppression systems.  
Hence, a larger number of simulations operated under that methodology. 
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Table 4.4.1.  Set of Experimental Fire Simulations 
Containment Presence / Posture Fire Type Heat Release Rate 
Unsuppressed Vent 10 kW 
Unsuppressed Surface 10 kW 
Unsuppressed Surface 1,296 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward) Vent 10 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward) Vent 1,296 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward) Surface 10 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward) Surface 1,296 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed downward) Vent 10 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed left) Vent 10 kW 
Suppressed (K-11 Right aimed left) Vent 10 kW 




As a method to dictate fire potential, FDS draws on its Heat Release Rate Per 
Unit Area (HRRPUA) keyword designation.  Fire vent dimensions of 0.05 m x 
0.05 m established a HRRPUA of 4,000 kW/m2 (4,000 kW/m2 x 0.0025 m2 = 10 
kW).  In surface tests, the upper surface of the lowest circuit board was defined 
as the source of combustion.  This established a 0.6 m by 0.6 m surface area 
which necessitated a HRRPUA value of 28 kW/m2 (28 kW/m2 x 0.36 m2 = 10 
kW).  In an effort to investigate the impact of a large-fire, further testing 
investigated greater heat release rates.  Within the fire protection arena, a heat 
release rate of 1,000 kW is commonly accepted as a small-room flashover 
threshold.  In some cases, slightly higher values may be reported.  Therefore, 
large-fire impacts were explored by observing fires possessing heat release rates 
of nearly 1,300 kW (3,600 kW/m2 x 0.36 m2 = 1,296 kW).  Paralleling this 
discussion, sample FDS input file listings are contained in Appendix F. 
 
Although an infinite number of simulation combinations exists, this particular set 
of experiments examined key aspects of simulated fire type, presence or 
absence of containment, and proposed minimum and maximum heat release rate 
values.  Adjustments in suppression orientation and placement accounted for the 
largest parameter variance, followed by fire type and size.  These trials 







Variations in fire size (small or large), combustion type (vent or surface), 
suppression availability (present or absent), and suppression posture (location 
and orientation) allowed for the construction of numerous fire scenarios.  In all, 
various aspects of eleven independent simulations were explored.  However, 
acknowledging and appreciating the development of common themes and 
trends, the following analysis focuses on unsuppressed and suppressed versions 
of the more representative FDS vent-style fire. 
 
5.2 Thermal Effects 
Thermal effects were observed and measured via a number of methods including 
isosurface, various slice files, boundary measurements, and a six-node 
thermocouple tree.  Isosurfaces provided tangible representations of fire flow and 
flame impingement.  Although extracted from an unsuppressed fire simulation, 
the isosurface example shown in Figure 5.2.1 represents initial fire spread 
common to both suppressed and unsuppressed scenarios.  It illustrates direct 
flame impingement on circuit boards one and two.  Low heat release rate 
scenarios demonstrated significant flame contact to circuit boards one, two, and 




Figure 5.2.1.  Isosurface Example 
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over all six circuit boards.  These types of sustained fire contact typically spell 
disaster for the functionality of components in question. 
 
Slice files, both normal and vector, assisted in the measurement of fire properties 
and gaseous flow and entrainment.  The examples in Figure 5.2.2 are 
representative of slice file appearance and implementation.  Within the sphere of 
thermal effects, normal slice files captured and displayed the continuous 
temperature gradient and heat concentrations as combustion progressed.  Vector 
slices captured these elements as well.  However, they also provided directional 
heat flow and intensity and gaseous entrainment insight.  Allowing more flexibility 
in placement, slice file data corroborated the abovementioned damage 
assessment and provided numeric temperature readings as support. 
 
Boundary file options provided further insight into potential thermal damage.  By 
recording surface thermal properties, boundary files illustrated destructive 
potential to the computer cabinet via temperature, radiative flux, and conductive 
flux measurements.  Because these measurements are not only restricted to the 
computer cabinet, but are also captured for the compartment’s walls, prospective 
damage for additional fire targets may be assessed as shown in Figure 5.2.3.  
Once again, using boundary file surface temperature measurements, both circuit 
board and computer cabinet damage was observed.  Figure 5.2.4 represents 
















Figure 5.2.4.  Boundary Temperature Measurements (Small HRR) 
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 rate fire.  Similarly, Figure 5.2.5 displays the same measurements for the 
unsuppressed, large heat release rate scenario.  Accepting NFPA’s relatively 
forgiving functional computer equipment thermal threshold of 79.4°C, even in the 
smaller fire scenarios, it should be noted that excessive and damaging 
temperatures were inflicted on all circuit boards. 
 
Represented as the yellow boxes in front of each circuit board, thermocouples 
imparted a further means of evaluating thermal conditions.  Figure 5.2.6 shows 
numeric temperature measurements taken over time during the unsuppressed 
burn with small heat release rate.  The thermocouples registered peak values 
after approximately 250 seconds of combustion with the highest readings 
occurring at levels above the site of ignition.  Specifically, thermocouples 3 and 4 
registered values approaching 650°C (1,202°F).  Additional heat-related 
simulation aspects, Figures 5.2.7 through 5.2.11, are represented below.  As 
additional material became involved, heat release rates of over 130 kW were 
observed.  Radiative loss levels climbed slightly higher than 75 kW.  Convective 
gains barely topped 1.30 kW.  Lastly, heat loss due to conduction peaked at 
slightly more than 30 kW.  Although various scales are denoted, these thermal-
property figures all possess near-peak values that are coincident with the fire’s 
maximum burn rate.  As the fuel supply was depleted, the fire’s size diminished 
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Figure 5.2.11.  Burn Rate Plot
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Although explicit times and quantitative measurements were initially unknown, 
these types of results were anticipated and are consistent with general fire 
experience.  In large-fire simulations, flame intensity grew dramatically and 
combustion rates multiplied.  Similar tests involving telecommunication switch 
gear bays showed thermocouples reaching peak values in approximately 10-12 
minutes and flames leaping to heights of 2-4 meters (6.56-13.12 feet) above a 
cabinet [39].  Before burning out, analogous results were recreated via the 
unsuppressed, large heat release rate simulation with the result of direct flame 
impingement on the compartment ceiling, as shown in Figure 5.2.12. 
 
Simulations involving standard sprinkler suppression emphasized water-misting-
literature findings and produced a mixed outcome.  As shown in Figure 5.2.13, 
although the course-spray, K-11 sprinkler was successful in drastically reducing 
combustion and cleansing the cabinet’s interior of fire products, its low-density 
spray and large droplets were not reliably able to entirely extinguish the fire after 
activation.  In this figure, inactive and active sprinklers are represented by red 
and green blocks, respectively.  Upon sprinkler activation, water simultaneously 
worked to contain the fire and force it out of the enclosure.  Although the fire was 
not always extinguished, it should be noted that the presence of fire suppression 
yielded appreciable results, as shown by the suppressed thermocouple plot in 
Figure 5.2.14.  While the temperature spike occurred at approximately the same 
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Figure 5.2.14.  Suppressed Thermocouple Plot 
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off rapidly as the sprinklers doused the cabinet with water.  Except for 
thermocouples located in the fire’s immediate vicinity, temperatures quickly fell to 
below 75°C.  These results confirmed water-based sprinkler effectiveness and 
demonstrated excellent potential for component protection. 
 
5.3 Mixture Fraction 
 
Similar to the HRR isosurface, FDS’s mixture fraction isosurface allowed for 
direct visualization of fire and smoke production and integration.  Seen both 
emblematically through isosurface (Figure 5.3.1) and fluidically via slice file 
(Figure 5.3.2), the mixture fraction representation exhibited toxic gas flow 
patterns, illustrated key areas of impact, and identified sites of increased 
corrosive damage.  As shown in Figure 5.3.1, the mixture fraction isosurface 
denoted flame and smoke separation in an observable, yet visually-obstructive 
manner.  However, the partial transparency of a mixture fraction slice file allowed 
for greater visualization of flame and smoke separation and flow. 
 
5.4 Species 
A final source of data produced by FDS was that of species production.  Species 
results modeled classic trends.  As the fire burned on, fuel and oxygen levels 
decreased.  Meanwhile, soot, water, and toxic/corrosive gas levels increased.  In 
particular, carbon dioxide (CO2), as its levels climbed almost 4 kg, and nitrogen 








Figure 5.3.2.  Slice File Mixture Fraction 
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increases.  Although the compartment’s initial oxygen supply decreased greatly, 
large amounts of water vapor were formed.  As the water vapor and the nitrogen 
content of the fire’s byproducts combined, it should be noted that corrosive 
nitrous and nitric acids were formed and deposited. 
 
Because species data was generated for the overall fire compartment, localized 
deposition of corrosive agents and soot could not be accurately determined.  One 
possible method of estimation would be to assume a uniform byproduct 
distribution throughout the fire compartment.  Under this premise, individual mass 
increases could be divided by the number of computational grid cells.  Continuing 
this line of thought, area-specific deposition amounts could be determined by 
calculating the number of grid cells intersected by the target in question.  For 
example, in the data presented within Figure 5.4.1, nitrogen levels increased by 
1.42 kg (1.42 x 109 µg).  The simulation grid was designed to have 360,000 
computational cells measuring 5 cm in width and length.  Each circuit board in 
the simulation measured 60 cm in width and length.  Consequently, the upper 
surface of a single circuit board would intersect 144 cells.  Therefore, quick 
division (1.42 x 109 µg / 360,000) yields an approximate concentration of 3,944 
µg per cell.  With 144 affected cells (5.68 x 105 µg) spanning 3,600 cm2, 
additional calculation (5.68 x 105 µg / 3,600 cm2) equates to contamination levels 
of 157.8 µg/cm2.  Unfortunately, as it has been previously established, soot and 





































Figure 5.4.1.  Species Plot 
 
70 
atmosphere of combustion.  Hence, an assumption of uniformity would yield 
inaccurate results. 
 
As these results have shown, thermal effects, mixture fraction, and species 
production each play a pivotal role in fire outcomes.  Fortunately, or unfortunately 
as the case may be, it was discovered that the fire’s thermal effects dominated 
the verdict of component tenability.  These results proffered valuable information 




Conclusions and Future Work 
 
6.1 Recommendations 
Although by no means comprehensive, this work serves as a catalyst to further 
research in the field of computer fire modeling.  The use of computer-based 
simulation tools provides a valuable avenue of insight and protection.  Through 
scenario modeling, several fire effects and suppression techniques may be 
explored that would otherwise prove to be too costly or impractical.  It has been 
shown that computer data centers pose a vulnerability to the effects of fire—
especially thermal aspects.  It became readily apparent that even relatively small 
fires common to this venue have disastrous potential.  Given the level of 
importance surrounding data and equipment in computing environments, this 
liability may be quite significant.  Water-based suppression tests yielded some 
self-evident results.  Those being, sprinklers are more effective when positioned 
closer to and oriented toward the source of combustion.  Although standard 
sprinkler equipment proved to be helpful, further exploration of hybridized gas-
water and water mist suppression techniques is also merited.  Obvious areas of 
future exploration include full-scale, real-life test burns and additional simulation.  
The value of future investigative results may also be enhanced by the inclusion of 




As referenced in the FDS User’s Guide, simulations and calculations are based 
on an evolving fire model and, given the correct conditions, can be accurate to 
within 10%-20% [45].  The complexity involved in fire modeling mandates an 
understanding of implied assumptions and technological limitations.  As 
investigation continues to reveal new insights, FDS’s computational fluid 
dynamics model can be updated.  However, in the analysis of this scenario, the 
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Fire Factors Affecting Human Tenability [54] 
Radiant Heat 




Human Exposure Limits* 
35 to 37.5 100% lethality in 1 min; 1% lethality in 10 seconds 
25.0 100% lethality in 1 min; significant injury in 10 seconds 
12.5 to 
15.0 1% lethality in 1 min; first-degree burns in 10 seconds 
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds; second-degree burns after 20 seconds 
4.0 to 5.0 
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 
seconds; however, blistering of the skin (second-degree burns) is likely; 0% 
lethality 
1.6 Causes no discomfort for long exposure 
* With exposed skin 
 






1. Causes pain after 1 min of exposure — — 2.1 
2. Will cause pain in 15 to 20 seconds and injury (second-
degree burns) after 30 seconds 
5 6.3 4.7 
3. Significant chance of fatality for extended exposure; high 
chance of injury after exposures of less than 30 seconds.  
Building made of cellulosic materials may suffer minor damage 
after prolonged exposure 
12.5 10 12.6 
4. Extended exposure results in fatality; there is a chance of 
fatality for instantaneous exposure.  Buildings that are made of 
cellulosic materials or not fire resistant will suffer damage after 
short exposures.  Fire-resistant structures and metal may suffer 
damage after prolonged exposure 
21.0 — 23.0 
5. Significant chance of fatality for people with instantaneous 
exposure.  Fire-resistant structures suffer damage after short 
duration.  Buildings of cellulosic materials ignite 
spontaneously.  Metal fatigue after short to medium exposure 





Convective Heat Exposure 
Temperature Effect 
260°F Difficult breathing 
300°F Mouth breathing very difficult, temperature limit for escape 
320°F Rapid, unbearable pain with dry skin 
360°F Irreversible injury in 30 seconds 
400°F Respiratory system tolerance time less than 4 min with wet skin 
 
Oxygen Depletion 
Effects of Oxygen Depletion 
Percent of 
Oxygen in Air Symptoms 
20 Normal 
17 Respiration volume increases, muscular coordination diminishes, attention and thinking clearly requires more effort 
12 to 15 Shortness of breath, headache, dizziness, quickened pulse, efforts fatigue quickly, muscular coordination for skilled movements lost 
10 to 12 Nausea and vomiting, exertion impossible, paralysis of motion 
6 to 8 Collapse and unconsciousness occurs 
6 or below Death in 6 to 8 min 
 
Four Stages of Asphyxiation 
Stage Percent Oxygen by 
Volume 
Symptoms 
1st 21 to 14% Increased pulse and breathing rate with disturbed 
muscular coordination 
2nd 14 to 10% Faulty judgment, rapid fatigue, and insensitivity to pain 
3rd 10 to 6% Nausea and vomiting, collapse, and permanent brain 
damage 
4th Less than 6% Convulsion, breathing stopped, and death 
 
 
Toxic Products of Combustion 
 
81 
Rule-of-Thumb for Carbon Monoxide (CO) hazard: 
• Concentration (ppm) x Time (minutes) > approx. 30,000 ppm-min is likely 
dangerous 
 
Limiting Conditions for Toxic Products of Combustion 
5-Min Exposure 30-Min Exposure Chemical Products 
Incapacitation Death Incapacitation Death 
Carbon monoxide 6000 ppm 12,000 ppm 1400 ppm 2500 ppm
Low oxygen < 13% < 5% < 12% < 7% 
Carbon dioxide > 7% > 10% > 6% > 9% 
 
 
Visibility Through Smoke 
Proposed minimum visibility requirements for egress: 
• 3 meters in primary fire compartment 




Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Fire Extinguishing 
Systems [30] 
Water Sprinkler System 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Cools the equipment 
• Completely safe for the 
environment and personnel 
• Often less expensive to install and 
use 
• Often uses only one system 
throughout a building 
• The release of water can be 
localized to where it is needed 
• Impurities in the water may ruin 
computer microchips and other 
equipment 
• Electrical danger may exist if an 
automatic electricity cut-off system 
has not been installed 
• Sprinklers usually do not activate 
until the temperature reaches 135°F, 
when damage to electronic 
components, magnetic tape, and 
disks may already have occurred 
• May not reach a fire located within 
a cabinet or piece of equipment 
• It can be difficult or impossible to 
restore equipment and recover data 





Halon 1301 System 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Extinguishes fire without damaging 
computer hardware or software 
• Does not conduct electricity 
• Puts out fires inside equipment and 
furniture and in areas that a water 
sprinkler cannot easily reach 
• The computer room can be fully 
operational within a couple of hours 
after the fire has been extinguished 
• Halon compounds contribute to the 
destruction of the ozone layer 
• Can be a health hazard, particularly 
to personnel suffering from asthma 
or heart problems 
• Release of the gas is extremely 
powerful, strong enough to throw 
equipment off desks, bring down 
false ceilings, and smash windows 
• It may take considerable time to 
gain approval for the installation of 
Halon 1301, because of the 
environmental concerns 
• Can be expensive 
• The fire may reignite if the gas is 
evacuated prematurely from the fire 
site 
• The gas fills the entire room in 






Partial Listing of Water Misting Technology Interest [38] 
Group Location 
Civil Aviation Authority U.K. 
Darchem Engineering U.K. 
FAA Technical Center Atlantic City, NJ 
Factory Mutual Research Norwood MA 
Fire Research Station U.K. 
DEC Avionics U.K. 






NRL Washington, D.C. 
Securiplex Technology Canada 
SINTEF Norway 






FDS Variable Descriptions [45] 
Symbol Description 
cp Constant pressure specific heat 
D Diffusion coefficient 
f External force vector (excluding gravity) 
g Acceleration of gravity 
Η  Total pressure divided by the density 
k Thermal conductivity; suppression decay factor 
m ′′′&  Production rate of ith species per unit volume 
Mi Molecular weight of ith gas species 
p Pressure 
p0 Background pressure 
qr Radiative heat flux vector 
q ′′′&  Heat release rate per unit volume 
ℜ  Universal gas constant 
T Temperature 
 t Time 
τ  Viscous stress tensor 
u = (u,v,w) Velocity vector 
Yi Mass fraction of ith species 
ρ Density 





FDS Default Parameter File Listing for Central K-11 Sprinkler [42] 
 
MANUFACTURER Manufacturer Information 
Central  
MODEL Sprinkler Model 
K-11  
OPERATING_PRESSURE Sprinkler operating pressure in units of bar. 
1.30  
K-FACTOR K-Factor of sprinkler in units of L/min/(bar)1/2. 
(Default 166) The flow rate will be given by mw 
= K√p where mw is the flow rate in L/min, K 
the K-factor in L/min/(bar) 1/2 and p the gauge 
pressure in bar 
166.  
RTI Response Time Index of the sprinkler in units 
of pm·s. (Default 165.) 
148.  
C-FACTOR C-Factor of sprinkler in units of pm/s. (Default 
0) 
0.7    
OFFSET_DISTANCE Distance in meters from the sprinkler orifice 
where the water droplets are initialized.  It is 
assumed that beyond the OFFSET 
DISTANCE the droplets have completely 
broken up. (Default 0.10 m) 
 
0.20  
ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE Link activation temperature (C). (Default 
74°C) 
74.  
SIZE_DISTRIBUTION Information about the droplet size distribution. 
1  
900.,2.43,0.58  
VELOCITY Description of the initial droplet velocity 
distribution. 
1  




Sample FDS Input File Listings 
Vent Unsuppressed 
 
&HEAD CHID='thesis',TITLE='Computer Cabinet – VentUnsuppressed' / 
 
* Dimensions 2.5m wide x 3.0m deep x 3.0m tall 
&PDIM XBAR=2.50,YBAR=3.00,ZBAR=3.00 / 
 
* 50 cells wide x 60 cells deep x 120 cells tall = 360,000 cells 
* cells 0.05m x 0.05m x 0.025m  
&GRID IBAR=50,JBAR=60,KBAR=120 / 
 
* time when finished = 1200 s 
&TIME TWFIN=1200. / 
 
* reaction is MMA, default surface is 'CONCRETE' 
* data saved every TWFIN/NFRAMES = 1200s/2400 = 0.5 s 
&MISC REACTION='MMA',NFRAMES=2400,SURF_DEFAULT='CONCRETE', 
      DATABASE='c:\nist\fds\database3\database3.data'  / 
 
* Fire called 'HEATER' with output = 4000 kW/m^2 
* Worst-case scenario 10kW fire 
* Heater surface .05m x .05m = approx. 0.0025 m^2 => approx. 10kW fire 
&SURF ID='HEATER',HRRPUA=4000. / 
 
* Creates vent with properties of 'HEATER' 
* .05m wide x .05m deep on circuit board 1 (lowest) 
&VENT XB=1.275,1.325,1.00,1.050,0.215,0.215,SURF_ID='HEATER' / 
 
* COMPUTER CABINET 
* circuit board 1 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.210000, 0.215000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 1 
* circuit board 2 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.425000, 0.430000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 2 
* circuit board 3 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.640000, 0.645000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 3 
* circuit board 4 
 
88 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.855000, 0.860000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 4 
* circuit board 5 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.070000, 1.075000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 5 
* circuit board 6 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.285000, 1.290000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 6 
 
* left side 
&OBST  XB=0.950000, 1.000000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Left Side 
* right side 
&OBST  XB=1.600000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Right Side 
* back 
&OBST  XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.600000, 1.650000, 0.000000, 2.000000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Back 
* top 
&OBST  XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.650000, 2.000000, 2.050000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Top 
 
* THERMOCOUPLE TREE 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.215,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.430,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.645,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.860,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.075,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.290,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
 
******************************************************************* 
* SLICE FILES 
******************************************************************* 
* VECTOR 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center 
x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center 
y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x 






&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center y 
 
* LEFT SIDE 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x 
 
* RIGHT SIDE 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x 
 
* BACK 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Back y 





* BOUNDARY FILES 
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING_RATE' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL_TEMPERATURE' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='CONVECTIVE_FLUX' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='RADIATIVE_FLUX' / 
 
 
Surface Suppressed (Sprinkler at back of cabinet aimed forward) 
 
&HEAD CHID='thesis',TITLE='Computer Cabinet – SurfaceBackAimedForward' / 
 
* Dimensions 2.5m wide x 3.0m deep x 3.0m tall 
&PDIM XBAR=2.50,YBAR=3.00,ZBAR=3.00 / 
 
* 50 cells wide x 60 cells deep x 120 cells tall = 360,000 cells 
* cells 0.05m x 0.05m x 0.025m  
&GRID IBAR=50,JBAR=60,KBAR=120 / 
 
* time when finished = 1200 s 
&TIME TWFIN=1200. / 
 
* reaction is MMA, default surface is 'CONCRETE' 
* data saved every TWFIN/NFRAMES = 1200s/2400 = .5 s 
&MISC REACTION='MMA',NFRAMES=2400,SURF_DEFAULT='CONCRETE',      
DATABASE='c:\nist\fds\database3\database3.data',RESTART_FILE='thesis.rest
art', 
      DATABASE_DIRECTORY='c:\nist\fds\database3\' / 
 
* Fire called 'HEATER' with output = 27.8 kW/m^2 
* Worst-case scenario 10kW fire 
* Heater surface .6m x .6m = approx. 0.36 m^2 => approx. 10kW fire 
&SURF ID='HEATER',HRRPUA=28. / 
 
* COMPUTER CABINET 
* circuit board 1 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.210000, 0.215000, 
SURF_IDS='HEATER','PMMA','PMMA' / Circuit Board - 1 
* circuit board 2 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.425000, 0.430000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 2 
* circuit board 3 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.640000, 0.645000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 3 
 
91 
* circuit board 4 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.855000, 0.860000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 4 
* circuit board 5 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.070000, 1.075000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 5 
* circuit board 6 
&OBST  XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.285000, 1.290000, 
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 6 
 
* left side 
&OBST  XB=0.950000, 1.000000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Left Side 
* right side 
&OBST  XB=1.600000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Right Side 
* back 
&OBST  XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.600000, 1.650000, 0.000000, 2.000000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Back 
* top 
&OBST  XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.650000, 2.000000, 2.050000, 
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Top 
 
* THERMOCOUPLE TREE 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.215,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.430,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.645,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.860,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.075,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.290,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
 
* SPRINKLERS 
* Central K-11 ELO (Extra Large Opening) Sprinklers 
* Alter default 0,0,-1 (downward) orientation to spray in -y direction 
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.290,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 / 
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.500,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 / 
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.720,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 / 
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.930,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 / 
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 1.150,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 / 
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 1.360,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 / 
 
******************************************************************* 





&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center 
x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center 
y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x 




&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center y 
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center x 
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center y 
 
* LEFT SIDE 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x 
 
* RIGHT SIDE 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x 
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x 





&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Back y 
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Back y 
******************************************************************* 
 
* BOUNDARY FILES 
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING_RATE' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL_TEMPERATURE' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='CONVECTIVE_FLUX' / 
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